We study mechanisms that select members of a set of agents based on nominations by other members and that are impartial in the sense that agents cannot in uence their own chance of selection. Prior work has shown that deterministic mechanisms for selecting any xed number k of agents are severely limited and cannot extract a constant fraction of the nominations of the k most highly nominated agents. We prove here that this impossibility result can be circumvented by allowing the mechanism to sometimes but not always select fewer than k agents. This added exibility also improves the performance of randomized mechanisms, for which we show a separation between mechanisms that make exactly two or up to two choices and give upper and lower bounds for mechanisms allowed more than two choices.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the setting of impartial selection rst studied by Alon et al. [1] and by Holzman and Moulin [8] . The goal in this setting is to select members of a set of agents based on nominations cast by other members of the set, under the assumption that agents will reveal their true opinion about other agents as long as they cannot in uence their own chance of selection. The assumption of impartiality seems justi ed, and is routinely made, in many situations where a strong correlation exists between expertise and self-interest, like the selection of representatives from within a group and the use of peer review in the allocation of funding and scienti c or academic credit.
Formally, the impartial selection problem can be modeled by a directed graph with n vertices, one for each agent, in which edges correspond to nominations. A selection mechanism then chooses, possibly using randomization, a set of vertices for any given graph, and it is impartial if the chances of a particular vertex to be chosen do not depend on its outgoing edges. As impartiality may prevent us from simply selecting the vertices with maximum indegree, corresponding to the most highly 1:2 Antje Bjelde, Felix Fischer, and Max Klimm k deterministic randomized exact randomized Table 1 . Bounds on α for α-optimal impartial selection of at most or exactly k agents. Deterministic exact mechanisms, not shown in the table, cannot be α-optimal for any α > 0. nominated agents, it is natural to instead approximate this objective. For an integer k, a selection mechanism is called a k-selection mechanism if it selects at most k vertices of any input graph. We call a k-selection mechanism exact if it always selects exactly k agents. A k-selection mechanism is called α-optimal, for α ≤ 1, if for any input graph the sum of indegrees of the selected vertices is at least α times the sum of the k largest indegrees.
In prior work, a striking separation was shown between mechanisms that do not use randomness and those that do. On the one hand, no deterministic exact α-optimal mechanism exists for selecting any xed number of agents and any α > 0 [1] . On the other, a mechanism that aligns the agents along a random permutation from left to right and selects a single agent with a maximum number of nominations from its left achieves a bound of α = 1/2 [7] . This bound is in fact best possible subject to impartiality [1] .
Our Contribution. We show here that a relaxation of exactness is another remedy to the strong impossibility result concerning exact deterministic k-selection mechanisms in that it enables the design of α-optimal mechanisms for constant α. Speci cally, for k = 2, running the permutation mechanism on a xed instead of a random permutation but selecting an agent for each direction of that permutation is 1/2-optimal. The factor of 1/2 is again best possible. Flexibility in the exact number of selected agents is bene cial also in the realm of randomized impartial mechanisms: given a set of three agents, for example, a 3/4-optimal mechanism exists selecting two agents or fewer, whereas the best mechanism selecting exactly two agents is only 2/3-optimal. For 2-selection from an arbitrary number of agents, we give a randomized exact 7/12-optimal mechanism and a randomized 2/3-optimal mechanism that is not exact. Finally we provide upper and lower bounds on the performance of mechanisms allowed to make more than two choices. A summary of our current state of knowledge is shown in Table 1 .
Related Work. The theory of impartial decision making was rst considered by de Clippel et al. [6] , for the case of a divisible resource to be shared among a set of agents. The di erence between divisible and indivisible resources disappears for randomized mechanisms, but the mechanisms of de Clippel et al. allow for fractional nominations and do not have any obvious consequences for our setting. Impartial selection is a rather fundamental problem in social choice theory, with applications ranging from the selection of committees to academic peer review. The problem we consider here was rst studied by Holzman and Moulin [8] and Alon et al. [1] , the articles of Holzman and Moulin and of Fischer and Klimm [7] provide a good introduction to its history and early literature. When agents are interested purely in their own selection the problem can be viewed as an example of mechanism design without money, an agenda put forward by Procaccia and Tennenholtz [13] . In peer review the need for impartiality is only one of a number of issues along with information elicitation and incentivization of e ort, and a natural approach would be to combine our mechanisms with mechanisms seeking to achieve the other goals [e.g., 17, 18] . Other authors have taken a more holistic view of peer review and peer selection and have aimed for more practical and more heuristic mechanisms [2, 9] . Tamura and Ohseto [16] were the rst to consider impartial mechanisms selecting more than one agent and showed that these can circumvent some of the impossibility results of Holzman and Moulin. An axiomatic characterization of the mechanisms was later given by Tamura [15] . Mackenzie [10] gave a characterization of symmetric randomized selection mechanisms for the special case where each agent nominates exactly one other agent. Inspiration for our title, and indeed for relaxing the requirement to always select the same number of agents, comes from the power of multiple choices in load balancing, where even two choices can lead to dramatically lower average load [e.g., 12]. The related concept of resource augmentation, rst used by Sleator and Tarjan [14] , is a common technique in the analysis of online algorithms and has also been applied to a problem in mechanism design [5] . Mackenzie [11] recently studied the relationship between impartiality, exactness, and randomization for various mechanisms used over the centuries in electing the pope.
Open Problems. With the exception of mechanisms that are asymptotically optimal, when many agents are selected [1] or when agents receive many nominations [4] , only very little was previously known about the impartial selection of more than one agent. Our understanding of 2-selection is now much better, with some room for improvement in the case of randomized mechanisms. About k-selection for k > 2, in particular about deterministic mechanisms for this task, we still know relatively little. This lack of understanding is witnessed by the fact that the optimal deterministic mechanism selecting up to two agents, one for each direction of a permutation, does not generalize in any obvious way to the selection of more than two agents. We may also hope for stronger techniques to bound the power of randomized mechanism that are universally impartial in the sense that they can be obtained as a convex combination of deterministic impartial mechanisms, and to design mechanisms that are impartial but not universally impartial. We will see in Section 4 that optimal mechanisms in the latter category may exhibit rather unintuitive nonmonotonicity properties, which in turn complicates their analysis. Meanwhile, the existence of a near-optimal mechanism in the limit of many selected agents suggests that the upper rather than the lower bounds may be correct. Table 1 illustrates that the relaxation of exactness can bene t both deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and that randomization can be bene cial independently of exactness. It is not clear, however, whether either of these statements is true for all values of n and k.
PRELIMINARIES
For n ∈ N, let
be the set of directed graphs with n vertices and no loops.
, j ∈ S, i ∈ X }| denote the sum of indegrees of vertices in X from vertices in S. We use δ − (X , G) as a shorthand for δ − N (X , G) and denote by ∆ k (G) = max X ⊆N , |X |=k δ − (X , G). When X = {i} for a single vertex i, we
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Most of the time, the graph G will be clear from context. We
. . , n}} be the set of subsets of the rst n natural numbers and let X n,k = {X ∈ X n : |X | = k} be the subset of these sets with cardinality k. A k-selection mechanism for G is then given by a family of functions f : G n → [0, 1] k l =0 X n,l that maps each graph to a probability distribution on subsets of at most k of its vertices. In a slight abuse of notation, we use f to refer to both the mechanism and individual functions from the family.
We call mechanism f deterministic if f (G) ∈ {0, 1} k l =0 X n,l , i.e., if f (G) puts all probability mass on a single set for all G ∈ G; and exact if ( f (G)) X = 0 for every n ∈ N, G ∈ G n , and X ∈ X n with |X | < k, i.e., if the mechanism never selects a set X of vertices with strictly less than k vertices.
Mechanism f is impartial on G ⊆ G if on this set of graphs the probability of selecting vertex i does not depend on its outgoing edges, i.e., if for every pair of graphs G = (N , E) and
Note that while impartiality requires the outgoing edges of a vertex i to have no in uence at all on whether i is selected or not, they may in uence both the number and the identities of other vertices selected. All mechanisms we consider are impartial on G, and we simply refer to such mechanisms as impartial mechanisms.
Finally, a k-selection mechanism f is α-optimal on G ⊆ G, for α ≤ 1, if for every graph in G the expected sum of indegrees of the vertices selected by f di ers from the maximum sum of indegrees for any k-subset of the vertices by a factor of at most α, i.e., if
We call a mechanism α-optimal if it is α-optimal on G.
For randomized mechanisms, and as far as impartiality and α-optimality are concerned, we can restrict attention to mechanisms that are symmetric, i.e., invariant with respect to renaming of the vertices [e.g. , 7] . It may further be convenient to view a k-selection mechanism as assigning probabilities to vertices rather than sets of vertices, with the former summing to at most k or exactly k for each graph. By the Birkho -von Neumann theorem [3] , the two views are equivalent in the following way.
P
. First consider the case where m is an integer, and let M = {1, . . . , m} andM = {m + 1, . . . , n}. Since
Thus Q is doubly stochastic, and by the Birkho -von Neumann theorem can be written as a convex combination of permutation matrices. For each individual permutation matrix R there then exists a set X ∈ X n,m such that r i j = 1 for some j ∈ M if and only if i ∈ X , which shows the claim.
When m is an arbitrary number, we can write p as a convex combination of two vectors p and p such that n i=1 p i = m and n i=1 p i = m . The claim then follows by applying the above reasoning independently to p and p .
DETERMINISTIC MECHANISMS
Focusing on the exact case, Alon et al. showed that deterministic k-selection mechanisms cannot be α-optimal for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} and any α > 0. This result is a rather simple observation for k = 1, but quite surprising when k > 1. For (n − 1)-selection in particular, any deterministic ALGORITHM 1: The bidirectional permutation mechanism, using extraction mechanism Ξ π Input:
select vertex based on forward edges i 2 := Ξπ (G); select vertex based on backward edges return {i 1 , i 2 }; mechanism that is both exact and impartial must sometimes exclude precisely the unique vertex with positive indegree. While it is not di cult to convince ourselves that a relaxation of exactness is not helpful in the case of 1-selection, we will exhibit momentarily a deterministic impartial mechanism that for any graph selects either one or two vertices whose overall indegree is at least the largest indegree of any vertex in the graph.
There are two ways to interpret this result. Since the largest indegree is at least half of the sum of the two largest indegrees, relaxing exactness allows us to circumvent the strong lower bound of Alon et al. when k = 2. Alternatively, for k = 1, the tradeo between impartiality and quality of the outcome disappears if one is allowed to sometimes but not always select an additional vertex. This kind of resource augmentation result, comparing an optimal algorithm to one from a restricted class that is given additional resources, is commonly used in the analysis of online algorithms and has recently also been applied to truthful mechanisms for facility assignment [5] .
To explain our mechanism in detail we need some additional notation. Let N = {1, . . . , n}. For a graph G = (N , E) and a permutation π = (π 1 , . . . , π n ) of N , denote by E π = (u, ) ∈ E : π i = u, π j = for some i, j with 1 ≤ i < j ≤ n the set of forward edges of G with respect to π . Denote byπ the permutation obtained by reading π backwards, such thatπ i = π n+1−i for i = 1, . . . , n. Finally, for a permutation π and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let π < j = {π 1 , π 2 , . . . , j} \ {j} denote the set of vertices in the pre x of π up to but not including j.
The rst mechanism we consider, which we call the bidirectional permutation mechanism, considers the vertices one by one according to a xed permutation π and in each step compares the current vertex π j to a single candidate vertex π l with l < j. In determining the indegree of the candidate vertex π l it takes into account the outgoing edges of vertices π 1 , . . . , π l −1 . For the indegree of the current vertex π j it takes into account the outgoing edges of vertices π 1 , . . . , π j−1 , with the exception of π l . If the latter is greater than or equal to the former, π j becomes the new candidate, and the candidate after the nal step is the rst vertex selected by the mechanism. The same procedure is then applied with permutationπ to nd a second vertex. A formal description of the bidirectional permutation mechanism is given as Algorithm 1. It is formulated in terms of Algorithm 2, which we call the extraction mechanism and which is identical to a mechanism of Fischer and Klimm except for its use of a given permutation rather than a random one.
It is worth noting that the bidirectional permutation mechanism may select only one vertex, namely if the same vertex is chosen for both directions of the permutation. This happens for example in the graph of Figure 1(a) .
To see that the bidirectional permutation mechanism is impartial, we rst note that this is true for a single run of the extraction mechanism. Indeed, the outcome of the latter is in uenced by the outgoing edges of any given vertex only when that vertex can no longer be selected. L 3.1. The extraction mechanism is impartial.
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Fig. 1. Graphs for which the bidirectional permutation mechanism returns only one vertex (a) and is only 1/2-optimal (b).
Impartiality of the bidirectional permutation mechanism then follows because the union of the results of k impartial 1-selection mechanisms yields an impartial k-selection mechanism.
Then the mechanism that selects the vertices selected by at least one of the mechanisms f 1 , . . . , f k is an impartial k-selection mechanism.
P
. By impartiality of f l , for l = 1, . . . , k, the outgoing edges of a vertex do not in uence whether this vertex is selected by f l . This holds for any l and any vertex, so it also holds for the mechanism that selects the vertices selected by at least one of the mechanisms.
We now proceed to show that the bidirectional permutation mechanism is 1/2-optimal, starting from the observation that the vertex selected by Ξ π has a maximum number of incoming forward edges with respect to π .
..,n {δ − π < j (j)}, and let i * be an arbitrary vertex with δ − π <i * (i * ) = d * . When i * is considered by the mechanism, so are at least d * − 1 of its incoming forward edges, one of which may originate from the current candidate i, i.e.,
, then i * becomes the new candidate. Since d will be set to d * , any other vertex that possibly becomes a candidate after i * has d * incoming forward edges as well, establishing the claim for this case.
If, on the other hand, both δ − π <i * \{i } (i * ) = d * − 1 and δ − π <i (i) = d * , then i remains the candidate. As d = d * any further candidate has d * incoming forward edges as in the rst case. T 3.4. The bidirectional permutation mechanism is impartial and 1/2-optimal. P . Impartiality follows directly from Lemma 3.1 and Lemma 3.2. Now consider a graph G = (N , E) , a vertex i * with δ − (i * ) = ∆ 1 , and let i 1 = Ξ π (G) and
, regardless of whether
The 2-partition mechanism with permutation Input: Graph G = (N , E) with n ≥ 2 Output: Vertices i 1 , i 2 ∈ N . Assign each i ∈ N to A 1 or A 2 independently and uniformly at random; Choose a permutation (π 1 , . . . , π n ) of N uniformly at random;
candidate vertex and indegree from its left for j = 2, . . . , n do S := (N \ A) ∪ (π <π j \ {i}) ; vertices that cannot be selected if π j ∈ A and δ − S (π j ) ≥ d then compare current vertex and candidate
current vertex becomes new candidate end end return i;
as claimed.
To see that the analysis is tight, consider the graph in Figure 1 (b). For this graph, the mechanism selects vertices π 2 and π 1 with an overall indegree of 1, while the maximum overall indegree of a set of two vertices is 2. We will see later, in Theorem 6.1, that the bound of 1/2 is in fact best possible.
RANDOMIZED MECHANISMS
In light of the results of the previous section, it is natural to ask whether a relaxation of exactness enables better bounds also for randomized mechanisms. We answer this question in the a rmative and give the rst nontrivial bounds for both exact and inexact 2-selection mechanisms, as well as an example that shows a strict separation between the two classes.
We begin by considering an exact mechanism, which we call the 2-partition mechanism with permutation. The mechanism randomly partitions the set of vertices into two sets A 1 and A 2 such that P[i ∈ A 1 ] = P[i ∈ A 2 ] = 1/2 for all i ∈ N , A 1 ∪ A 2 = N , and A 1 ∩ A 2 = ∅. It then selects one vertex from each of the sets by applying the extraction mechanism with a random permutation, while also taking into account incoming edges from the respective other set. Algorithm 3 is a formal P . When A is empty, the mechanism selects the same vertex for any graph and therefore is impartial. Otherwise the rst vertex in A to appear in π becomes a candidate and only vertices from A are considered thereafter, so the mechanisms selects a vertex from A. Moreover, the mechanism only takes into account outgoing edges of vertices that can no longer be selected, either because they are not in A or because they have already been considered and are not currently the candidate. This directly implies impartiality. We now obtain our result for the 2-partition mechanism with permutation. T 4.3. The 2-partition mechanism with permutation is impartial and 7/12-optimal. P . Impartiality follows directly from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 4.1. Now consider a graph G = (N , E), two distinct vertices i * 1 , i * 2 ∈ N with δ − (i * 1 ) + δ − (i * 2 ) = ∆ 2 , and let i 1 and i 2 be the two vertices selected by the mechanism from sets A 1 and A 2 , respectively. We distinguish two cases, depending on whether i * 1 and i * 2 are in the same set or di erent sets of the partition (A 1 , A 2 ) .
First assume that i * 1 and i * 2 are in di erent sets, and without loss of generality that i * 1 ∈ A 1 and i * 2 ∈ A 2 . In the permutation π used by the mechanism and chosen uniformly at random, an arbitrary vertex i ∈ N \ {i * 1 , i * 2 } appears before or after each of i * 1 or i * 2 with equal probability, so
When i * 1 is considered by the mechanism, so are any incoming edges from vertices in A 2 and any incoming edges from vertices in A 1 that appear in π before i * 1 . Thus, by Lemma 4.2, the partition and thus P[i * 2 ∈ A 2 ] = 1, we obtain
As the same line of reasoning applies to i * 2 , we have
and conclude for this case that
Now assume that i * 1 and i * 2 are in the same set of the partition, and without loss of generality
In the permutation π used by the mechanism and chosen uniformly at random, an arbitrary vertex i ∈ N \ {i * 1 , i * 2 } appears before, between, or after i * 1 and i * 2 with probability 1/3 each, so P i ∈ A 2 = 1 2 and
, a possible edge from i * 2 to i * 1 would be considered by the mechanism, and by Lemma 4.2,
Since we assumed that i * 1 ∈π <i *
2
, we have
Antje Bjelde, Felix Fischer, and Max Klimm ALGORITHM 5: The randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism Input: Graph G = (N , E) Output: Set {i 1 , i 2 } ⊆ N of at most two vertices Choose a permutation (π 1 , . . . , π n ) of N uniformly at random; Invoke Algorithm 1, the bidirectional permutation mechanism, for G and π
As each of the two events takes places with probability 1/2, we conclude for this case that
Averaging over both cases we nally obtain
The 2-partition mechanism with permutation improves on the best deterministic mechanism for 2-selection, and it is natural to ask whether it can be improved upon further by a randomized 2-selection mechanism that is not exact. The answer to this question is not obvious: while the ability to select fewer vertices may make impartiality easier to achieve, actually selecting fewer vertices runs counter to the objective of selecting vertices with a large sum of indegrees. Indeed, in the case of 1-selection, no separation exists between exact and inexact mechanisms. For 2-selection, an obvious approach turns out to be e ective: taking the best deterministic mechanism, which uses both directions of a xed permutation, and invoking it for a random permutation. The resulting mechanism, which we call the randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism, is shown as Algorithm 5. T 4.4. The randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism is impartial and 2/3-optimal.
P . The proof of Theorem 3.4 shows impartiality for any permutation that does not depend on the input to the mechanism, including one that is chosen uniformly at random. Now consider a graph
, and let i 1 = Ξ π (G) and i 2 = Ξπ (G) for the permutation π used by the mechanism. Assume without loss of generality that i * 1 appears before i * 2 in π , i.e., that i * 1 ∈ π <i *
. As π was chosen uniformly at random, an arbitrary vertex i ∈ N \ {i * 1 , i * 2 } appears before, between, or after i * 1 and i * 2 with probability 1/3 each. By applying Lemma 3.3 to both i 1 and i 2 , Recall that possibly i 1 = i 2 , and note that the bound is correct in this case as well. To bound the right-hand side of (1), we use the assumption that i * 1 ∈ π <i * 2 and observe that
Note that this bound only gets better when (i * 1 , i * 2 ) ∈ E, as by assumption
An analogous argument for the other direction yields
and by plugging both bounds into (1) we obtain
It is not hard to see that our analysis of the 2-partition mechanism with permutation and the bidirectional permutation mechanism is tight. T 4.5. The 2-partition mechanism with permutation is at most 7/12-optimal. The randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism is at most 2/3-optimal.
P
. Consider a graph with a large number of vertices and only two edges (i, i * 1 ) and (i, i * 2 ), and observe that the maximum overall indegree of any set of two vertices is 2.
The 2-partition mechanism with permutation independently and uniformly at random assigns each of i * 1 , i * 2 , and i to one of two sets, such that in particular i * 1 and i * 2 are in the same set with probability 1/2 and in di erent sets with probability 1/2. If i * 1 and i * 2 are in the same set, the mechanism selects at most one of them. If i is in the respective other set, i.e., with probability 1/2, this happens with probability 1. If i is in the same set, it happens only with probability 2/3, namely when i appears before either i * 1 and i * 2 in a permutation π chosen uniformly at random. If i * 1 and i * 2 are in di erent sets, one of them is selected with probability 1, the other only when i appears before it in π , which happens with probability 1/2. In summary we thus expect α ≤
The randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism selects one of i * 1 and i * 2 with probability 1, the other only when i appears between i * 1 and i * 2 in a permutation π chosen uniformly at random, which happens with probability 1/3. Thus we conclude that α ≤ As special cases of Theorem 6.2 and Theorem 6.3 in Section 6, we will respectively obtain upper bounds of 3/4 and 2/3 for 2-selection mechanisms without and with exactness. These bounds suggest that neither the randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism nor the 2-partition mechanism with permutation is the best mechanism within its class. Figure 2 shows a 3/4-optimal impartial mechanism selecting at most two of three vertices, which certi es that the randomized bidirectional permutation mechanism is indeed not the best and that relaxing exactness is strictly bene cial. The mechanism of Figure 2 can be obtained as the solution of an optimization problem to maximize the expected overall indegree of the vertices selected subject to impartiality, and its lack of universal impartiality illustrates one of the main obstacles that prevent us from obtaining tighter bounds and generalize our results to the selection of more than two vertices. Here, a mechanism is called universally impartial if it is a convex combination of deterministic impartial mechanisms. Mechanisms that are impartial but not universally impartial are notoriously di cult to analyze and sometimes exhibit rather peculiar behavior. The last two rows of the rightmost column of Figure 2 for example show a decrease in the probability of selecting two of the vertices as their indegrees go up, and this is both necessary for 3/4-optimality and di cult to justify.
SELECTING MORE THAN TWO AGENTS
The central component of our best inexact mechanisms, its use of one or both of the directions of a random permutation, does not generalize in any obvious way to the selection of additional vertices.
ALGORITHM 6:
The k-partition mechanism with permutation Input: Graph G = (N , E) with n ≥ 2 Output: Vertices i 1 , . . . , i k ∈ N Assign each i ∈ N independently and uniformly at random to one of k sets A 1 , . . . , A k ; Choose a permutation (π 1 , . . . , π n ) of N uniformly at random; for j = 1, . . . , k do i j := Ξ π,A j (G) ; select one vertex from each set using extraction mechanism end for j = 1, . . . , k do if A j = ∅ then Choose i j uniformly at random from N \ {i 1 , . . . , i k }; end end return {i 1 , . . . , i k };
Our understanding of deterministic mechanisms for the selection of more than two vertices is particularly limited, but we can obtain a bound of 1/k by observing that the selection of only two instead of k vertices reduces the guarantee by a factor of at most 2/k and applying this observation to the bidirectional permutation mechanism.
A better bound for the randomized case, even with exactness, is achieved by a natural generalization of the 2-partition mechanism with permutation that uses a partition into k sets. The general mechanism is described formally as Algorithm 6. Its impartiality is easy to see, and we use an argument similar to that in the proof of Lemma 4.2 to obtain a performance guarantee that approaches 1 − 1/e as k grows.
T 5.1. The k-partition mechanism with permutation is impartial and α-optimal for α =
P . Impartiality follows directly from Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 4.1. Now consider a graph G = (N , E) and a set I * of vertices with |I * | = k and i ∈I * δ − (i) = ∆ k , and denote the vertex selected by the mechanism from A j by i j , for j = 1, . . . , k. For a xed set A j with A j ∩ I * ∅, let i * ∈ A j ∩ I * such that i ∈ π <i * for all i ∈ A j ∩ I * \ {i * }. Then,
where the inequality holds by a similar argument as in the proof of Lemma 4.2 and the equality because we have chosen i * to be the vertex in A j ∩ I * that appears last in π . In the permutation π used by the mechanism and chosen uniformly at random, a given vertex appears after i * with probability |A j ∩ I * |/(|A j ∩ I * | + 1), so
where we have used that for i ∈ N \ I * ,
and by linearity of expectation,
and simplify (2) to conclude that
It is again not hard to see that this analysis is tight.
. Consider a graph with a large number of vertices and only k edges
Consider a graph G = (V , E) with n vertices where k + 1 vertices are arranged in a directed cycle and the remaining vertices do not have any outgoing edges, i.e., V = {1, . . . , n} and E = {(i, i + 1) : i = 1, . . . , k} ∪ {(k + 1, 1)}. Denote by F the set of vertices selected from G by an arbitrary deterministic k-selection mechanism, and observe that there exists i ∈ {1, . . . , k + 1} \ F . Let G = (V , E \ ({i} × V )), and observe that by impartiality, the mechanism does not select i from G . The mechanism thus selects at most k − 1 out of the k vertices with positive indegree in G and cannot be more than (k − 1)/k-optimal.
The next result result applies to randomized mechanisms without the requirement of exactness and shows that the mechanism of Figure 2 for the case when k = 2 and n = 3 is best possible. T 6.2. Consider a k-selection mechanism that is impartial and α-optimal on G n , where
otherwise.
P
. It is without loss of generality to assume that the k-selection mechanism is symmetric, i.e., that it assigns equal probabilities to indistinguishable vertices.
First assume that k ≤ n − 2, and consider the two graphs on n vertices where k + 2 of the vertices have edges as in Figure 3 and the remaining vertices do not have any incoming or outgoing edges. It is easily veri ed that any symmetric impartial mechanism must assign probabilities as shown in Figure 3 . In the graph on the left, the mechanism chooses a set of vertices with expected overall indegree (k + 1)p 1 , while the maximum overall indegree for a set of k vertices is k, so α ≤ (k + 1)p 1 k .
In the graph on the right, the mechanism chooses a set of vertices with expected overall indegree 2p 1 + 2kp 2 , while the maximum overall indegree for a set of k vertices is 2k. Thus
where the second inequality holds because 2p 1 + kp 2 ≤ k by the graph on the right. In summary,
where the second inequality holds because the minimum takes its maximum value when the two terms are equal. Now assume that k = n − 1 and consider the two graphs on n vertices and edges as in Figure 3 . Any symmetric impartial mechanism must again assign probabilities as shown. In the graph on the left, the mechanism chooses a set of vertices with expected overall indegree kp 1 , while the maximum overall indegree for a set of k vertices is k, so α ≤ p 1 .
In the graph on the right, the mechanism chooses a set of vertices with expected overall indegree 2p 1 + 2(k − 1)p 2 , while the maximum overall indegree for a set of k vertices is 2(k − 1) + 1. Thus . . . . Impartial probability assignment for five graphs with n vertices T 6.3. Consider a k-selection mechanism that is exact, impartial, and α-optimal on G n , where k < n. Then
if 2 ≤ k = n − 1 5 7 if 2 = k = n − 2 7k 3 +5k 2 −6k +12 7k 3 +13k 2 −2k
P . First assume that 2 ≤ k = n − 1, and consider the two graphs with n = k + 1 vertices shown in Figure 5 . By impartiality, the probability of selecting the vertex at the top left must be equal for both graphs. Any symmetric mechanism assigns equal probabilities to all vertices in the left graph and equal probabilities to all vertices with indegree 1 in the right graph. Denoting the former probability by p 1 and the latter by p 2 , exactness implies that (k + 1)p 1 = p 1 + kp 2 = k, so p 1 = k/(k + 1), p 2 = (k − k/(k + 1))/k = k/(k + 1), and thus α ≤ p 2 = k/(k + 1). Now assume that 3 ≤ k = n − 2, and consider the ve graphs with ve vertices shown in Figure 6 . Using similar arguments as above it is easily established that any symmetric impartial mechanism must assign probabilities as shown. By the rst and second graph, p 1 = k/(k + 2) and
